## Approved For Relea 2005/03/06 SCIA-RDP80B01554R003300300011-5

Tape 5
Side A, 2 - 2 1/2

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29 JAN 1979

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Comments	on		to	be	used	at	the	NFIB	meeting:

- 1. Page 4: I really question the word "interposition" in the next to the last line. Short of tactics like those at the battle of Lepanto, there for a ship itself is no way/to interpose yourself between another ship and where it wants to go. This could be changed to have played a primarily a counter-show of force role.
- 2. Page 5: Is it really true the Soviets are doing a lot of military sales on long-term credits at low interest rates? I'd like to know the numbers and trends here. I've had the impression they are doing more sales for hard currency to places like Iraq and Libya.
- 3. Page 7: What are the examples of Soviet combat involvement in Syria, a slim reed Iraq and Angola--air units or advisors in the field? Ethiopia seems/to me also--yes, they had a general down there doing the overall planning. I assume that is all we are talking about.
- 4. Page 10: On this debate about whether the Soviets have forces designated for intervention, it seems to me like it is angels on the head of a pin. I don't know of any forces in the United States has designated for intervention.
- 5. Page 13: We say the Soviets aren't going to be ready to do a Normandy invasion in the next decade. This is typical of the problems of doing intelligence analysis. We are trying to measure the Soviets against the US Marine Corps as a norm. There are two problems with this. First, the US Marine Corps has the

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wrong norm itself--in my opinion. Second, there is no reason the Soviets should want the Marine Corps' norm even if it is a good one.